Tsinghua Science and Technology
Volume 19

Issue 5

Article 8

2014

An Efficient and Practical Public Key Cryptosystem with CCASecurity on Standard Model
Zhen Liu
Department of Network and Information Security Key Laboratory, Engineering University of the Armed
Police Force, Xi’an 710086, China.

Xiaoyuan Yang
Department of Network and Information Security Key Laboratory, Engineering University of the Armed
Police Force, Xi’an 710086, China.

Weidong Zhong
Department of Network and Information Security Key Laboratory, Engineering University of the Armed
Police Force, Xi’an 710086, China.

Yiliang Han
Department of Network and Information Security Key Laboratory, Engineering University of the Armed
Police Force, Xi’an 710086, China.

Follow this and additional works at: https://tsinghuauniversitypress.researchcommons.org/tsinghuascience-and-technology
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Zhen Liu, Xiaoyuan Yang, Weidong Zhong et al. An Efficient and Practical Public Key Cryptosystem with
CCA-Security on Standard Model. Tsinghua Science and Technology 2014, 19(05): 486-495.

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tsinghua Science and Technology by an authorized editor of Tsinghua
University Press: Journals Publishing.

TSINGHUA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ISSNll1007-0214ll08/13llpp486-495
Volume 19, Number 5, October 2014

An Efficient and Practical Public Key Cryptosystem with
CCA-Security on Standard Model
Zhen Liu, Xiaoyuan Yang , Weidong Zhong, and Yiliang Han
Abstract: Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) security on the standard model is widely accepted as the standard
security notion for the public key cryptosystem. The existing CCA-secure public key cryptosystems on the standard
model are expensive in terms of efficiency and practicality. In this paper, an efficient and practical public key
cryptosystem is presented over the group of signed quadratic residues. It is provably secure against CCA on
the standard model. Furthermore, public verifiability for this scheme is also realized in the way that projects the
verification privacy key into public key on trapdoor pretending. It will be useful to devise efficient CCA-secure
threshold and proxy re-encryption schemes on the standard model.
Key words: public key cryptosystem; standard model; Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA)-security; public verifiability

1
1.1

Introduction
Background

Security definitions.
It is essential to use
cryptographic protection when transferring sensitive
information over a public network. A secure encryption
scheme is often thought of as a “secure envelope”
(containing a message or plaintext) which can be
opened, and so read, only by the addressee[1] . The
first formal definition of security, known as semantic
security[2] , formalized the intuition that a ciphertext
does not leak any information about the message. To
create a secure envelope that prevents anyone from
meaningfully modifying the plaintext, another property,
called non-malleability, has to be taken into account:
We do not want an attacker to be able to change the
ciphertext and obtain a new plaintext related to the old
one. A secure envelope is non-malleable, but it has
been shown that semantic security (in general) does not
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assure non-malleability[3] .
Chosen ciphertext security is a stronger notion
than non-malleability[3] . It is formalized by letting
the adversary have access to a “decryption oracle”,
allowing the adversary to decrypt the ciphertext of
his choice[4, 5] . To devise efficient Chosen Ciphertext
Attack (CCA)-secure public key cryptosystems,
cryptographers introduced a so-called random oracle[6] ,
which idealizes the hash function as a perfect random
function. The random oracle model views this as
“strong evidence” that the scheme is secure. Many
practical CCA-secure Public Key Cryptosystems
(PKC) have been devised in this way. However, the
random oracle model has recently been criticized for
its unrealistic assumptions[7] . There is current interest
in constructing efficient CCA-secure PKC under the
standard model (without resorting to random oracles).
Nowadays, chosen ciphertext security under the
standard model is widely accepted as the standard
security notion for public key cryptosystems. However,
constructing a CCA-secure public key cryptosystem is
very challenging, and is expensive in terms of efficiency
and practicality. This is no longer an issue in the light
of new, practical CCA-secure schemes, whose first
example was given by Cramer and Shoup in Ref. [8].
Public verifiability. In a CCA-secure cryptosystem,
we check ciphertexts for consistency and decrypt only
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those that are “well-formed”[9] . Consistency checks can
be either private or public: the check is private if it
requires at least partial knowledge of the private key
(e.g., in Ref. [9]), while public checks do not require
any secrets (e.g., in Refs. [10, 11]). A cryptosystem
with a publicly verifiable ciphertext is called a publicly
verifiable cryptosystem.
Publicly verifiable cryptosystems have important
applications in some conditions.
Consider an intermediate party, called a gateway
(e.g., Fig. 1)[12] , and assume that the sender’s encrypted
messages are transmitted over a public network until
they reach a gateway that is trusted by the receiver
to forward faithfully, and are then forwarded by the
gateway over a private network to the receiver.
By the above reasoning, IND-CCA security is
required for the encrypted traffic from (possibly
malicious) senders towards the gateway, but for
messages on the internal network, including from
the gateway to the receiver, IND-CPA security is
sufficient in practice to preserve confidentiality. If
the gateway just forwards all (IND-CCA) ciphertexts
from the outside world without modification, all
security goals remain satisfied. However, if this is a
publicly verifiable encryption scheme, the gateway can
perform a consistency check, and detect and filter out
invalid IND-CCA ciphertexts. The efficiency is thus
improved[12] .
We also note that the public verifiability has been
extensively addressed in a different context. For
example, in firewall technologies, we only verify the
consistency of the ciphertext with public information
before decryption, so as to discard the inconsistent
ciphertext. Publicly verifiable cryptosystems can solve
this problem. Furthermore, they can be used to design
IND-CCA secure threshold decryption schemes[13] and
CCA-secure proxy re-encryption schemes[14-16] under
the standard model.
1.2

Related works

The first practical CCA-secure public key cryptosystem
without random oracle was proposed by Cramer and
Shoup[8] . It was a significant work in public key

Fig. 1

Gateway.
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cryptography at the time, but it now needs more privacy
keys and exponentiations. Later, their construction
was generalized to the Smooth Hash Proof System
(SHPS)[17] . For a long time, the SHPS remained the
only way to construct practical CCA secure public key
encryption schemes on the standard model.
In 2004, Canetti et al.[18] proposed the first universal
way to construct a CCA-secure public key cryptosystem
on the standard model from identity-based encryption,
but it needs a one-time signature, so it is not an efficient
construction. Boneh and Katz[19] improved their scheme
by replacing the one-time signature with a message
authentication code. Although message authentication
codes are efficient in computing, existing identitybased encryption schemes are based on inefficient
parings, so it is still less efficient than the CramerShoup encryption scheme[8] . Boyen et al.[20] directly
constructed chosen ciphertext security schemes from
identity-based techniques, but their method is still based
on inefficient parings.
In Ref. [21], Peikert and Waters proposed a general
framework for constructing CCA-secure encryption
from the lossy trapdoor function. In Ref. [22], Rosen
and Segev proposed a general way under the correlated
inputs function. However, they still need one-time
signatures.
At Eurocrypt 2008, Cash et al.[23] proposed a
practical CCA-secure scheme (CKS08) under the
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
Haralambiev et al.[24] further improved the efficiency of
CKS08, but these schemes are hybrid cryptosystems.
Altogether, existing CCA-security encryption
schemes under the standard model can be classified
into three kinds. The first is based on the CramerShoup cryptosystem and later Smooth Hash Proof
System. They are efficient constructions, but not
publicly verifiable schemes, and can be improved for
efficiency. The second kind of scheme is based on
identity-based techniques. They are publicly verifiable,
but are not efficient schemes due to the use of
parings. The last kind of scheme is based on the lossy
trapdoor function. They are publicly verifiable, but are
not efficient schemes due to the one-time signature.
Fischlin and Schnorr suggested a group of signed
quadratic residues in Ref. [25]. This group is useful for
cryptography since its membership can be publicly (and
efficiently) verified while it inherits some intractability
properties of quadratic residues. Furthermore, for two
memberships x and y, if x 2 =y 2 holds, x D y also
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holds[26] . This convenient property can be used to
construct CCA-secure public key encryption on the
standard model.
1.3

The contributions

In this paper, we devised a practical CCA-secure
public key cryptosystem under the standard model
based on a group of signed quadratic residues. It
needs neither one-time signature nor parings, thus is an
efficient construction. Compared to the Cramer-Shoup
encryption scheme, we reduced both private keys and
exponentiations. Furthermore, we projected the private
key into the public key for verification on trapdoor
pretending, realizing public verifiability for our scheme.

2
2.1

Preliminaries
Notations

If k 2 N is a security parameter, then 1k denotes a string
of k bits. Typically, an adversarial advantage should be
bounded by 2 k , and a typical value for k is 80. If
r > 1 is a rational number, then Œr D 1; 2;   ; dre. If
S is a set, then s R S denotes an operation of picking
an element s of S uniformly at random. It writes
A.x; y;    ) to indicate that A is an algorithm with
inputs x; y;    , and by z R A.x; y;    / it denotes an
operation running A with inputs .x; y;    / and letting
z be the output.
2.2

Factoring

A prime number P is called a safe prime if P D 2p C 1
for a prime p. We assume a Probabilistic Polynomial
Time (PPT) algorithm IGen that, on inputting a
security parameter k in unary, generates two random
safe primes P D 2p C 1 and Q D 2q C 1 with
bitlength.p/ D bitlength.q/ D .lN .k//=2 1. We
assume that p and q are also primes, such that P
and Q are congruent 3 modulo 4 and N D PQ is a
Blum integer. IGen.1k / returns N along with P and
Q: Here, lN .k/ denotes a function that represents,
for any given secure parameter k, the recommended
(bit-) size of the composite modulus N . For the rest
of this paper, we assume that N is generated by the

factoring instance generator, IGen. The set QRN 2 ZN
of quadratic residues modulo N is defined as


QRN WD fx 2 ZN
W 9y 2 ZN
with y 2 D x mod N g,

since ZN 2 Z2  Z2  Zpq , QRN is a cyclic group
of order pq. Notice that this implies that a uniformly
chosen element of QRN is a generator (of QRN ) with
overwhelming probability. Computations in QRN are

Tsinghua Science and Technology, October 2014, 19(5): 486-495

computations modulo N . If it is implied by context,
we omit explicitly writing “mod N ” for calculations in
modulo N .
Factoring assumption. We assume that there is no
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm such that given
only N , the random output of IGen.1k / can factor
N with non-negligible probability. For example, one
commonly used at a secure level of 80, lN .80/ D 1024.
2.3

The group of signed quadratic residues

Let N be an integer. For x 2 ZN we define jxj as the
absolute value of x, where x is represented as a signed
integer in the set f. .N 1//=2;    ; .N 1/=2g. For a

sub-group G of ZN
we define the “signed group”, G C ,
as the group
G C WD fjxj W x 2 Gg
with the following group operation. Specifically, for
g; h 2 G C and an integer x, we define
g ı h WD jg  h mod N j;
g x WD g ı g ı    ı g D jg x mod N j:
„
ƒ‚
…
x times

More complicated expressions in the exponents are
computed in modulo group order, for example, g 1=2 D
1
C
g 2 mod ord.G / . Note that taking the absolute value is
a surjective homomorphism from G to G C with trivial
kernel if 1 2 G, and with kernel f 1; 1g if 1 2 G.
Let N be a Blum integer such that 1 2 QRN . We
are mainly interested in QRC
N , which we call signed
quadratic residues (modulo N ). QRC
N is a subgroup

of ZN
= ˙ 1, with absolute values as a convenient
computational representation. The following basic facts
have already been noted in Ref. [26] .
(1) .QRC
N ; ı/ is a group of order ∅.N /=4.
C
C
(2) QRC
N D JN . In particular, QRN is efficiently
recognizable (given only N ).
(3) If QRN is cyclic, so is QRC
N.
2
D
Z 2 mod N ” Y D
(4) If Y; Z 2 QRC
,
then
Y
N
k
k
Z mod N . More generally, Y 2 D Z 2 mod N ”
Y D Z mod N .
2.4

Public key cryptosystem

Definition 1. A public key cryptosystem is a tuple of
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Kgen, Enc,
Dec) such that:
(1) Kgen is a probabilistic key-generation algorithm
that takes as input 1k , for a security parameter k in N ,
and returns a public key pk and a secret key sk. The
public key pk defines a space M , called message space.
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(2) Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input
a public key pk and a message m in M and returns a
ciphertext c.
(3) Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes as
input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and returns a
message m or the reject symbol ?. Moreover, a further
fundamental property is required: correctness. We want
that, for every k in N , every pair (pk,sk)
Kgen.1k /,
and for every message m in M , the following equation
holds:
PrŒDec.sk; Enc.pk; m// D m D 1:
We now give another notion of security, namely
security against chosen ciphertext attack[4, 5] . It will
become clear that the latter definition leads to a stronger
concept of security. In fact, the adversary against CPAsecurity is not interactive, while the adversary against
CCA2-security (in common with other papers, we just
call it CCA-security), defined below, has access to a
decryption oracle used to decrypt any ciphertext. To
a public-key cryptosystem ˘ and an adversary A, we
associate the following experiment ExpCCA
.A;˘ / , played
between A and a challenger:
(1) The challenger generates a public and a secret key
(pk,sk) Kgen.1k / and gives the public key pk to A.
(2) A poses a number of decryption queries to the
challenger: A sends a ciphertext to the challenger which
gives back the plaintext m D Dec.sk; c/.
(3) A sends two messages m0 and m1 to the
challenger. The challenger chooses a uniform bit b and
sends the challenge ciphertext c
Enc(pk; mb / to A.
(4) A asks for more decryptions, as in Step 2, but
without the possibility of asking for the decryption of
the challenge ciphertext.
(5) A outputs a bit b 0 .
This exchange outputs 1 if, and only if, b 0 D b.
We define the advantage of the adversary as follows:
CCA
1=2j:
AdvPubCCA
.A;˘ / .k/ D j PrŒExp.A;˘ / .k/ D 1
Definition 2. A public-key cryptosystem ˘ is
.Qd ; t; "/-secure against chosen ciphertext attack if, for
adversary whose running time is bounded by t and that
makes at most Qd decryption queries, the following
inequality holds:
AdvPubCCA
.A;˘ / .k/ 6 ":
2.5

Decision Diffie-Hellman problem

The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem in a generic
group. Let G be a group of prime order q, and consider
the following two distributions:
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 The distribution R of quadruples .g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; u2 /,
where g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; and u2 are chosen at random.
 The distribution D of quadruples .g1 ; g2 ; g1r ; g2r /,
where g1 ; g2 2 G are chosen at random, and r 2
Zq is chosen at random.
An algorithm that solves the Decision Diffie-Hellman
problem is a statistical test that can distinguish between
the two distributions. That is, given a quadruple coming
from one of the two distributions, it should output 0 or 1,
and there should be a non-negligible difference between
(a) the probability that it outputs a 1 given an input from
R, and (b) the probability that it outputs a 1 given an
input from D. The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is
hard if there is no such polynomial-time statistical test.
The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem in a group
of signed quadratic residues. Let QRC
N be a group of
signed quadratic residues for the choice of N by IGen,
such that QRC
N is a cyclic group of order pq (p and q
are primes). Consider the following two distributions:
 The distribution R of quadruples .g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; u2 /,
where g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; and u2 are chosen in QRC
N at
random.
 The distribution D of quadruples .g1 ; g2 ; g1r ; g2r /,
where g1 ; g2 2 QRC
N are chosen at random, and
r 2 Œ.N 1/=4 is chosen at random.
An algorithm that solves the Decision Diffie-Hellman
problem is a statistical test that can distinguish the two
distributions. That is, given a quadruple coming from
one of the two distributions, it should output 0 or 1, and
there should be a non-negligible difference between (a)
the probability that it outputs a 1 given an input from R,
and (b) the probability that it outputs a 1 given an input
from D. The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem is hard
if there is no such polynomial-time statistical test.
Boneh[27] gave that for the choice of N D PQ,
such that P D 2p C 1 , Q D 2q C 1, and P; Q; p; q
are primes, the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem in
QRN is intractable, and at least as hard as the Decision
Diffie-Hellman problem in generic groups. QRC
N is a
surjective homomorphism to QRN with the same order
pq. Hence, the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem in
QRC
N is at least as hard as the Decision Diffie-Hellman
problem in generic groups.
2.6

Target-collision resistant hashing

Informally, the function H W X ! Y is a TargetCollision Resistant (TCR) hash function (a universal
one-way hash function), if, given a random pre-image
x 2 X , it is hard to find x 0 D x meets H.x 0 / D
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H.x/, or given a constanty Y , it is hard to find
x 2 X meets H.x/ D y.
Lemma 1 From ˝Ip .T ; R/, the probability of
computing tag ti ’s Ki or the current session key Kj i
maintained in rj is negligible.
Proof The messages in ˝Ip .T ; R/ that do not
involve Ki or Kj i do not give any advantage in
obtaining these keys. Ki is used in the form of
E:Ki .Kj i jjIDiT / and Kj i is used in the form of
E:Ki .Kj i jjIDiT /, E:Kj i .ıjjIDiT /, and E:Kj i .ıjjKj0 i jj
E:Ki .Kj0 i jjIDiT //. By Lemma 1, even if adversaries
obtain many values of these forms, it is computationally
infeasible to obtain Ki . As a result, when the length of
Ki and Kj i is both lkey , the probability of computing
one of these keys is 1=2lkey . If lkey is sufficiently long,
this is negligible. Therefore, this lemma holds.


3

3.1

CCA-Secure Public Key Cryptosystem
over Signed Quadratic Residues
Instance generator

Here, it restricts our scheme to a special case of QRC
N,
for the following choice of N generated by the factoring
instance generator IGen.
3.2

The scheme

Let H D .Hk /.k2N / be a target-collision resistant hash
C
v
function with H : ZN QRC
N QRN ! f0; 1g for each
H 2 Hk . Define the following public key cryptosystem
PKC D .Kgen, Enc, Dec/.
Key generation (Kgen.1k /)
Kgen chooses uniformly at random:
 a modulus N D PQ D .2pC1/.2qC1/ generated
with IGen.1k /, such that P; Q; p; q are primes,
 two generators g1 ; g2 of QRC
N,
 two exponents a; b 2 Œ.N 1/=4, and
 a hash function H 2 Hk .
v
Kgen then sets X1 D .g1 g2 /.2 ab/ 2 QRC
N ; X2 D
v
C
.2 b/
.g1 g2 /
2 QRN , and outputs a public key pk and a
secret key sk, where pk D .N; g1 ; g2 ; X1 ; X2 ; H / and
sk D .a; b/.
Encryption (Enc.pk; m/)
Enc chooses uniform y 2 Œ.N 1/=4, sets
v
C1 D mX1 2 y 2 ZN ,
v
C2 D g1 2 y 2 QRC
N,
2v y
C3 D g2
2 QRC
N,
t D H.C1 ; C2 ; C3 / 2 .1;    ; 2v 1/,
C4 D ..g1 g2 /t X2 /y 2 QRC
N,
and outputs ciphertext C D .C1 ; C2 ; C3 ; C4 /.
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Decryption(Dec.sk; C /)
C
C
Dec verifies that .C2 ; C3 ; C4 / 2 QRC
N  QRN  QRN
and rejects if not.
It then computes t D H.C1 ; C2 ; C3 /, and tests
v
2v
whether C4 D .C2 C3 /t C2 b holds. If this condition
does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs ?;
2v a
otherwise, it outputs m D .C1 .C2 C3 /at /=.C4 /.
Correctness. The correctness of the scheme might be
not obvious, so we prove it here.
Proof Fix a public key pk D .N; g1 ; g2 ; X1 ; X2 ; H /
and a secret key sk D .a; b/ as produced by Kgen.1k /,
and assume that C D .C1 ; C2 ; C3 ; C4 / is a ciphertext
generated by Enc(pk; m/. We will show that Dec.sk; C /
outputs m as follows.
C
First, it is clear that .C2 ; C3 ; C4 / 2 QRC
N  QRN 
C
C
QRN as the element in QRN can be efficiently
recognized.
2v
Also, it can be compute that C4
D
2v y
t 2v y
2v b2v y
t
..g1 g2 / X2 /
D .g1 g2 /
.g1 g2 /
D
v
v
.C2 C3 /t .C2 C3 /2 b D .C2 C3 /t C2 b .
This completes the ciphertext’s consistency
verification.
2v a
Then, Dec.sk; C / computes .C1 .C2 C3 /at /=.C4 / D
2v y

v

v

D
.mX1 .g1 g2 /2 yat / / ...g1 g2 /t X2 /2 ay /
2v 2v abyC2v yat
2v yatC2v 2v aby
.m.g1 g2 /
/=...g1 g2 /
// D m;
so Dec.sk; C / can output m as desired.
3.3

Security against chosen-ciphertext attack

We prove our scheme is secure against a chosen
ciphertext attack under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumption over the group of signed quadratic residues,
which is proved to be at least as hard as the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption in generic groups in Section
2.5.
Theorem 1 The above public key encryption
scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks, assuming that (1) the hash function H is
collision resistant, and (2) the Decisional DiffieHellman problem is hard in the group of signed
quadratic residues.
Proof we assume there is an adversary that can
break the cryptosystem, and we show how to use this
adversary to construct a statistical test for the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem.
For the statistical test, we are given .g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; u2 /
coming from either distribution R or D. Our
construction works as follows.
We build a simulator that simulates the joint
distribution consisting of the adversary’s view in its
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attack on the cryptosystem and the bit bt generated
by the decryption oracle (which is not a part of the
adversary’s view). It will be clear from the construction
that if the input happens to come from D, the simulation
of this joint distribution is perfect, and so the adversary
has a non-negligible advantage. We then show that if
the input happens to come from R, then the adversary’s
view is essentially independent of bt, and therefore the
adversary’s advantage is negligible. This immediately
implies a statistical test distinguishing R from D.
We now give details of the simulator. The input
to the simulator is quadruples .g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; u2 / and
g1 ; g2 ; u1 ; u2 2 QRC
N.
Prepare the public key. The simulator runs the
key generation algorithm, using the given g1 and
g2 . Specifically, the simulator chooses two exponents
a; b 2 Œ.N 1/=4 and a hash function H 2 Hk
v
at random and computes X1 D .g1 g2 /2 ab 2 QRC
N,
v
C
2 b
2 QRN . The public key that the
X2 D .g1 g2 /
adversary sees is pk D .N; g1 ; g2 ; X1 ; X2 ; H /. The
simulator knows the corresponding private key sk D
.a; b/.
Answer the decryption queries. When the
adversary poses a number of decryption queries to
the simulator, the simulator answers decryption queries
as in the actual attack, which it can do since it knows
the private key.
Prepare the challenge ciphertext. We now describe
the simulation preparing the challenge ciphertext. When
the adversary chooses m0 and m1 , and gives them to the
simulator, the simulator chooses bt 2 f0; 1g at random,
and computes
v
v
c1 D mbt  .u1 u2 /2 2 ab ,
v
2
c2 D u1 ,
2v
c3 D u2 ,
t D H.c1 ; c2 ; c3 /,
v
c4 D .u1 u2 /t .u1 u2 /2 b ,
and outputs c  D .c1 ; c2 ; c3 ; c4 /.
Answer the decryption queries. When the
adversary asks for more decryptions, but without
the possibility of asking for the decryption of the
challenge ciphertext, the simulator answers decryption
queries as in the actual attack.
This completes the description of the simulator. As
we see, when the input to the simulator comes from
D, the output of the encryption oracle is a perfectly
legitimate ciphertext; however, when the input to the
simulator comes from R, the output is not legitimate,
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in the sense that logg1 u1 ¤ logg2 u2 . This is not a
problem, and indeed, it is crucial to the proof of
security.
First, consider the joint distribution of the adversary’s
view and the bit bt when the input comes from
y
y
distribution D. Say u1 D g1 and u2 D g2 . Then, it is
v 2v ab

clear that .u1 u2 /2
2v y

2v y

D X1

2v y

2v

2v

, u1 D g1 , u2 D

v

g2 , and .u1 u2 /t .u1 u2 /2 b D ..g1 g2 /t X2 /y . From
this it is clear that the joint distribution of the
adversary’s view and bt is identical to that in the actual
attack.
Second, consider the more interesting case of the
distribution of the adversary’s view and the bit bt
when the input comes from R. We want to show
that the adversary’s view and bt are essentially
independent. This argument will be purely information
theoretic, except that it will rely on the assumption that
the adversary cannot find a collision in the hash function
H.
First, we give some notation and terminology. Let
log./ denote the logarithm to base g1 , and let w D
y1
wy2
log g2 . Let u1 D g1 and u2 D g1 . We may assume
that y1 ¤ y2 , since this occurs with overwhelming
probability. Also, let us define a tuple .c10 ; c20 ; c30 ; c40 /
to be a “valid ciphertext” if there exists y 0 2 Œ.N
2v y 0

v

1/=4 such that c20 D .u01 /2
2v

D g1

2v y 0
g2 .

, and c30 D

.u02 / D
Otherwise, we will say it is an “invalid
ciphertext”.
Claim 1 If the decryption oracle rejects all invalid
ciphertexts during the attack, then bt is independently
distributed from the adversary’s view.
To see this, consider the pair .a; b/ 2 Œ.N
1/=4  Œ.N 1/=4. At the beginning of the attack,
this is a random point on the line 2v .1 C w/ab D
log X1 (this is the information about .a; b/ leaked
by the public key). Moreover, if the decryption
oracle only decrypts valid ciphertexts .c10 ; c20 ; c30 ; c40 /,
then the adversary obtains only linearly dependent
relations 2v y 0  2v .1 C w/ab D 2v y 0 log X1 (since
v v

v v

0

2v y 0

.u1 u2 /2 2 ab D .g1 g2 /2 2 aby D X1 /. Thus, no
further information about .a; b/ is leaked.
We now consider the output of the simulated
encryption oracle. We have
!
!
!
log X1
1 1
2v ab
:
D
log.c1 =mbt /
y1 y2
2v abw
Since the matrix in the above equation is nonsingular
.y1 ¤ y2 /, for each choice of bt 2 f0; 1g, there exists
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exactly one solution .ab; w/. This implies that the
distribution of bt is independent of the adversary’s view.
Claim 2 Assuming the adversary does not find a
collision in H , then with overwhelming probability,
the decryption oracle will reject all invalid ciphertexts
during the attack.
The ciphertext validity method of our scheme was
introduced in Refs. [28, 29]. For more detail, we give
the proof as follows.
We consider what happens when the adversary
presents a single invalid ciphertext .c10 ; c20 ; c30 ; c40 / ¤
.c1 ; c2 ; c3 ; c4 / to the decryption oracle. First, assume
that .c10 ; c20 ; c30 / D .c1 ; c2 ; c3 /. In this case, the hash
values are the same but c40 ¤ c4 . This implies that the
decryption oracle will certainly reject. Second, assume
that .c10 ; c20 ; c30 / ¤ .c1 ; c2 ; c3 /. Let t 0 D H.c10 ; c20 ; c30 /
and t  D H.c1 ; c2 ; c3 /. We are assuming, by collision
intractability, that t 0 ¤ t  and t 0 is independent to t  .
v

2v y10

Let c20 D .u01 /2

D g1

y10

y20

2v wy20

and c30 D .u02 /2

v

D

, where
¤
(since the ciphertext is
g1
invalid). The decryption oracle will not reject if, and
v 0
v
0
v
v
only if, .c40 /2 D .c20 c30 /t C2 b D .u01 u02 /2 .t C2 b/ .
We now study the distribution of .b; t  ; t 0 / as seen
by the adversary. From the adversary’s view, this is
essentially a random point on the line formed by
intersecting the hyperplanes:
log X2 D 2v .1 C w/b,
log c4 D .y1 C wy2 /t  C 2v .y1 C wy2 /b,
log c40 D .y10 C wy20 /t 0 C 2v .y10 C wy20 /b.
The first equation comes from the public key, and
the second comes from the output of the encryption
oracle. Also note that decrypting a valid ciphertext leaks
no information about b.
Consider0the 3  3 matrix,
1
2v .1 C w/
0
0
B
C
Matr D @ y1 C wy2 y1 C wy2
0
A:
0
0
0
0
y1 C wy2
0
y1 C wy2
It is clear that Matr is nonsingular, because even
when the adversary sees the first two entries of the
vector,
1
0
1
0
b
log X2
C
B
C
B
@ log c4 A D Matr @ t  A ;
t0
log c40
the last entry will be independent of the adversary’s
v
view. However, then the probability that .c40 /2 D
v 0
v
0
v
.c20 c30 /t C2 b D .u01 u02 /2 .t C2 b/ is negligible, and
when equality does not hold, the decryption oracle will
reject.

This completes the proof of security.
3.4

Efficiency

We claim that, with some trivial optimizations,
encryption uses roughly four exponentiations, and
decryption roughly three. Specifically, encryption can
y
y
y
y
first compute R D X1 , S D g1 , T D g2 , W D X2 ,
which are four full exponentiations. Then, the
remaining computations require only multiplications
or exponentiations with very small exponents: C1 D
v
v
v
mR2 , C2 D S 2 , C3 D T 2 , C4 D .S T /t W .
Similarly, decryption can first compute U D .C2 C3 /a ,
a
V D .C2 C3 /b , Z D C4 , which are three full
exponentiations. Then, the remaining computations
v
2v
that verify C4 D .C2 C3 /t V 2
and compute
v
m D .C1 U t /=Z 2 require only multiplications or
exponentiations with very small exponents.
For concreteness, let us assume that one regular
exponentiation with an exponent of length l requires
1:5l modular multiplications, and that one squaring
takes the same time as one multiplication. Let us further
assume that lN D bitlenth.N / D 1024. For v D 80 bits
security, then encryption requires 4:5v C 6lN D 6504
multiplications; decryption requires 6vC4:5lN D 5088
multiplications.
The detail of efficiency comparison is as shown
in Table 1. “BMW” is the PKC scheme from
Ref. [10]. “CS” is the PKC scheme from Ref. [8]. “BK”
is the PKC scheme from Ref. [19]. “Ours” is our scheme
of this paper. “BDDH” is the Bilinear Decisional DiffieHellman assumption. “jP j” expresses the length of a
group element in the column of the ciphertext, and
we assume message m is also an element in the
group, “Mac” expresses the message authentication
code, “com” expresses commitment. “pk/sk” are the
counts of the public key and private key, respectively.
Considering efficiency, we count the computation
number of bilinear pairings and the exponentiations
used in encryption and decryption whose computation
is time-costing. We use the “exps” to express the times
of exponentiation. For comparison, we omit very small
exponents and mention that relative timings for the
various operations are as follows[30] : bilinear pairing=5
and regular exponentiation=1.

4
4.1

Publicly Verifiable Scheme
Instance generator

Here, it restricts our scheme to a special case of QRC
N,
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Table 1
Scheme
CS
BK
BMW
Ours

Security assumption
DDH
BDDH
BDDH
DDH

Efficiency comparison.

Ciphertext overhead
4jP j
3jP j C Mac C com
3jP j
4jP j

for the following choice of N generated by the factoring
instance generator IGen.
4.2

The scheme

Let H D .Hk /.k2N / be a target-collision resistant hash
C
v
function with H : ZN QRC
N QRN ! f0; 1g for each
H 2 Hk . Define the following public key cryptosystem
PVPKC D .Kgen; Enc; Pver; Dec/.
Key generation (Kgen.1k /)
Kgen chooses uniformly at random:
 a modulus N D PQ D .2pC1/.2qC1/ generated
with IGen.1k /, such that P; Q; p; q are primes,
 two generators g1 ; g2 of QRC
N,
 two exponents a; b 2 Œ.N 1/=4, and
 a hash function H 2 Hk .
v
Kgen then sets X1 D .g1 g2 /.2 ab/ 2 QRC
N ; X2 D
v
,
computes
the
projection
of
.g1 g2 /.2 b/ 2 QRC
N
verification private key b as e D .2v b 1=2/ mod pq;
and outputs a public key pk, a verification public
key vk, and a secret key sk, where pk D .N; g1 ; g2 ;
X1 ; X2 ; H /, vk D e, and sk D .a; b/.
Encryption (Enc.pk; m/)
Enc chooses uniform y 2 Œ.N 1/=4, sets
v
C1 D mX1 2 y 2 ZN ,
v
C2 D g1 2 y 2 QRC
N,
v
2 y
C3 D g2
2 QRC
N,
t D H.C1 ; C2 ; C3 / 2 .1;    ; 2v 1/,
C4 D ..g1 g2 /t X2 /y 2 QRC
N,
and outputs ciphertext C D .C1 ; C2 ; C3 ; C4 /.
Public verification (Pver.e; C /)
C
C
Dec verifies that .C2 ; C3 ; C4 / 2 QRC
N  QRN  QRN
and rejects if not. It then computes t D H.C1 ; C2 ; C3 /,
2vC1
and tests whether C4
D .C2 C3 /2tC2eC1 holds. If
this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm
outputs ?.
Decryption(Dec.sk; C /)
Dec computes t D H.C1 ; C2 ; C3 / and m D
2v a
.C1 .C2 C3 /at /=.C4 /, then outputs m.
4.3
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Public verifiability

Theorem 2 (Ciphertext consistency of PVPKC)
Assuming H is a target collision resistant hash function,
and the factoring assumption holds, the ciphertext of the

exps(Enc)
5
3
3
4

exps(Dec)
6
6
6
3

Keysize (pk/sk)
7/6
7/1
.n C 3/.n C 2/
6/2

above PVPKC is consistent if, and only if, it can pass
public verification.
Proof we first consider the verification equation in
v
2v
the above PKE that C4 D .C2 C3 /tC2 b . It must use
the value b, which is the private key, so the verification
operation cannot be implemented publicly.
To this end, we consider the equation in
2v
QRC
which can be expressed as C4
D
N,
v
v
v
v
..g1 g2 /t X2 /2 y D .g1 g2 /t 2 y .g1 g2 /2 b2 y D
.C2 C3 /t .C2 C3 /.eC1=2/ mod pq .
Notice that, as pq is a secret value to us, we cannot
compute 1=2 mod pq . However, recalling the property
2
2
in QRC
N that Y D Z mod N , Y D Z mod N , we
2vC1

can compute C4
D .C2 C3 /2tC2eC1 .
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
4.4

Security

Recalling the PKC scheme above, it is not a
publicly verifiable construction because the consistency
verification of the ciphertext needs private key b. To
realize public verification, we project private key b
into verification public key e. Considering the project
operation e D .2v b 1=2/ mod pq, it is obvious that
the distribution of e and b is uniform. So if the project
operation is a unidirectional function under the DDH
assumption, the PVPKC will be a CCA-secure scheme
as PKC. As factoring assumption is weaker than DDH
assumption (if the DDH assumption holds, the factoring
assumption also holds), we will prove the unidirectional
characteristic of the project operation as follows.
Claim
3
Assume
modulus
N D PQ D
.2p C 1/.2q C 1/ generated with IGen.1k /, such
that P; Q; p; q are primes, v is a public parameter
in Œ.N 1/=4, so if the factoring assumption holds,
the project operation e D .2v b 1=2/ mod pq is
unidirectional.
Proof We prove that, if there exists an adversary
A who can compute the value 2v b when given the
value e D .2v b 1=2/ mod pq with overwhelming
probability, then there exists an adversary B who can
factor N with the same advantage.
 C
B uniformly chooses u R .ZN
/ nQRC
N and sets
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h D u2 (notice that h 2 QRC
N /.
Then, B chooses e 2 N at random, and sends it to A.
A computes 2v b D .e C 1=2/ mod pq, and sends it
to B.
B computes 2v b e D 1=2 mod pq, then computes
v
v D h1=2 mod pq D h2 b e 2 QRC
N.
C
C
Since u … QRN and v 2 QRN are two nontrivially
different square roots of h, B can factor N by
computing gcd.u v; N /. This completes the proof.

5

Conclusions

The notion of CCA-security is now widely accepted
as the standard security notion for public-key
cryptosystems. An efficient cryptosystem is the
cryptographists’ goal, but existing CCA-secure public
key cryptosystems are based either on inefficient
pairings and one-time signatures, or on many more
keys and exponential operations. In this paper, we
proposed an efficient public key cryptosystem with just
a few exponentiations over a group of signed quadratic
residues, and proved its CCA-security under the DDH
assumption.
In some practical application conditions of CCAsecure cryptosystems, such as constructing CCAsecure threshold cryptosystems and proxy re-encryption
schemes, they need a consistent check for ciphertext
that can be implemented publicly (without any privacy
key). We projected the private key into the public key
for verification in our scheme, which realized public
verifiability.
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